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SENSE AND NONSENSE ABOUT 
STATE IMMUNITY 
.David E Engdahl* 
Defending the state immunity principle of National League of 
Cities v. Useryi is a lonely and somewhat suspect task for a consti-
tutional scholar today. Having played a small contributing part2 
in precipitating that controversial decision, however, this writer 
perhaps has some modest obligation to attempt to illuminate the 
debate. 
The judicial and academic discussions of National League of 
Cities contain a great deal of nonsense on both sides of the issue. 
The single most troublesome bit of nonsense is the idea that the 
principle somehow derives from the tenth amendment. To be 
sure, that attribution is made by its judicial proponents, but it is 
woefully inapt. Another recurrent mistake is the claim that Na-
tional League of Cities is a revival of the long-discredited "dual 
federalism" doctrine. Yet another is the notion that the principle 
is tied to the commerce clause. In fact, National League of Cities 
itself was not truly a "commerce clause case." National League of 
Cities, like most of United States v. Darby J actually turned on the 
necessary and proper clause.4 In Darby at least, if lamentably not 
in National League of Cities, the distinction was plainly indicated.s 
That clause provides ample textual basis for a state immunity 
principle. 
• Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound. 
I. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
2. The author was retained by counsel for the National League of Cities, et. al., as a 
consultant pending rebriefing and reargument of the case at the 1975 Term. A memoran-
dum by the author, including some excessively sharp language, was slightly altered without 
the author's review and submitted to the Court as an amicus brief on behalf of the National 
Association of Counties and the National Association of County Civil Attorneys; it re-
mains a source of slight embarassment to the author. 
3. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
4. Id at 117-24 (involving sections 6, 7, and 15(a)(2) of the original Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act). This is to be distinguished from that part of the opinion discussing section 
15(a)(l), id at 112-17. 
5. According to the Darby Court, Congress's power reaches intrastate activities 
when "re~ulation of them [is an) appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, 
the exerCise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce," citing Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819), the premier construction of the 
necessary and proper clause. 312 U.S. at 118-19. 
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The state immunity principle has a pedigree of legitimacy 
confirmed by the same post-New Deal justices who finally laid the 
"dual federalism" error to rest. Moreover, a largely unnoticed 
footnote in a Supreme Court opinion subsequent to National 
League of Cities confirms that the state immunity principle applies 
beyond the commerce clause and even the necessary and proper 
clause. 
These rather unconventional observations, the reader will 
doubtless agree, require some elaboration and documentation. It 
will be useful to start with a careful exposition of the "dual feder-
alism" concept-the error of which the state immunity principle is 
often wrongly accused. 
I 
The Constitution plainly contemplates a nation of "states"; 
but it is less plain what the term "state" might mean. Indeed, the 
term is clearly used with quite different meanings in different parts 
of the Constitution. The Supreme Court confronted this problem 
in Texas v. White, where Chief Justice Chase observed that the 
term 
describes sometimes a people or community of individuals united more or less 
closely in political relations, inhabiting temporarily or permanently the same 
country; often it denotes only the country or territorial region, inhabited by such a 
community; not infrequently it is applied to the government under which the peo-
ple live; at other times it represents the combined idea of people, territory, and 
government. 
Pressing for the most fundamental meaning of the term, Chase 
continued: 
It is not difficult to see that in all these senses the primary conception is that 
of a people or community. The people, in whatever territory dwelling, either tem-
porarily or permanently, and whether organized under a regular government, or 
united by looser or less definite relations, constitute the State. 6 
It was with respect to states in this primary conception of 
"community" that Chase declared, "[t]he Constitution, in all its 
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of inde-
structible states." It is likewise in this primary sense "of a people 
or political community, as distinguished from a government," that 
the term state is used, according to Texas v. White, 
in the clause (of the Constitution] which provides that the United States shall 
guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and shall 
protect each of them against invasion. 
6. See 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 720 (1869) for these passages. 
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In this clause a plain distinction is made between a State and a government 
of a State. 
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Taking "state" in this sense, secession and participation in the 
Confederacy could not render the political community within the 
boundaries of Texas less than a constituent state of the Union-
although those efforts were sufficient to divest that community of 
any lawful state government.7 
Had the Constitution used the term "state" consistently in 
this sense, the dual federalism notion would have had less founda-
tion. Putting aside those provisions in which the term is used 
plainly with a geographical meaning,s however, there are several 
clauses where it is used to include state governments, as Chief Jus-
tice Chase observed.9 These clauses provide a colorable basis for 
the misapprehension that it was the state governments that com-
bined to constitute the Union. But James Madison had high-
lighted the absurdity of this misconception in The Federalist: 
Was then the American revolution effected, ... was the precious blood of 
thousands spilt, and the hard earned substance of millions lavished, not that the 
people of America should enjoy peace, liberty and safety; but that the Govern-
ments of the individual States . . . might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be 
arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? 10 
The basic precept of republican government is that it is the peo-
ple-the political communities collected as states in the Union-
and not their governments, in which sovereignty inheres.11 
Unfortunately, just three years after Texas v. White, the 
Court lost sight of this crucial point when it decided Collector v . 
.Day.12 Throughout that opinion, "states" and their governments 
are equated. From this false equation derives the notion that 
7. Jd at 725,721, and 726, respectively. Remaining a "state" in this sense, the Court 
held, Texas was entitled to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, even through 
de facto officials of challengeable legal authority undertaking to act on the state's behalf. 
Id at 731-32. 
8. "(A)s in the clauses which require that a representative in Congress shall be an 
inhabitant of the State in which he shall be chosen, and that the trial of crimes shall be held 
within the State where committed." 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 721. 
9. "In the Constitution the term "state" most frequently expresses the combined idea 
. . . of people, territory and government. . . . In the clauses which impose prohibitions 
upon the State in respect to the making of treaties, emitting of bills of credit, and laying 
duties on tonnage, and which guarantee to the State representation in the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, are found some instances of this use in the Constitution. Others 
will occur to every mind." 74 U.S. (7 Wall) at 721. Treaties, bills of credit, and duties are 
acts of governments; and senators were chosen by state governments until ratification of the 
seventeenth amendment in 1913. 
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 309 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
II. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 ( 1793 ); see particularly the opinions of 
Wilson, J., and Jay, C.J. 
12. 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 113, 126 (1871). See also Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 
Wall.) 71, 76 (1869). 
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"[t]he two governments are upon an equality .... [I]n respect to 
the reserved powers, the State is as sovereign and independent as 
the General Government." Confounding the states with their gov-
ernments, Collector v. Day made "dual federalism" the foundation 
for a tax immunity of state government instrumentalities. 
Chase had made it clear in Texas v. White that he was using 
the term "state" in its primary sense of a "political community" 
when he wrote of "the right of self-government by the States."t3 
The sovereign political community constituting a state can exer-
cise its "right of self-government" through those national instru-
mentalities of governance that it chooses to employ jointly with 
affiliated communities, as much as through those peculiar gov-
erning institutions it might choose to erect on its own. A political 
community occupying a discrete geographical area but lacking 
any separate governing institutions is an anomaly not to be found 
outside the federal capital except in such extraordinary circum-
stances as were presented by the Civil War. Consequently, a sen-
sible principle of state immunity must indeed take account of 
states' governments, as well as the political communities them-
selves. It must take account of those governments, however, not 
as entities entitled to respect for their own sakes, but rather as the 
instruments chosen by the sovereign people of one or another dis-
crete political community to satisfy some of their needs. 
Governments satisfy the needs of political communities by 
exercising power. As Madison observed, in defining the boundary 
between the power of state and federal governments one confronts 
difficulties inherent in language.t4 The Constitution provides that 
"Congress shall have Power" to do a variety of things. But 
"power" is only "the ability or faculty of doing a thing."ts The 
term denotes legal competence to take action concerning some 
subject matter; this is true whether one speaks of a "power of ap-
pointment," a "power of attorney," or judicial, executive, or legis-
lative "power." What are enumerated, then, in the Constitution 
are the several subject matters with which the national legislature 
13. 74 U.S. (7 Wall) at 725. 
14. (N]o language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every com-
plex idea, or so correct as not to include many equivocally denoting d~erent 
ideas. . . . [T]his unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less, accordmg to 
the complexity and novelty of the objects defined. . . . Here then are three 
sources of vague and incorrect definitions; indistinctness of the object, imperfec-
tion of the organ of conception, inadequacies of the vehicle of ideas. Any one of 
these must produce a certain degree of obscurity. The Convention, in delineating 
the boundary between the Federal and State jurisdictions, must have experienced 
the full effect of them all. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 236-37 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See a/so id at 235. 
15. Id, No. 33, at 204 (A. Hamilton). 
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has power to deal. There may be disputes as to the nature or 
scope of those subject matters, because human activities some-
times can be characterized with equal propriety in different ways. 
In practice, choices must constantly be made as to which charac-
terizations should have legal effect; but to say that the federal gov-
ernment has power as to certain subject matters is more accurate 
than to say it has a bundle of different powers. 
Several constitutional clauses, however, including the tenth 
amendment, do use the plural, "powers." Taking too literally this 
verbal shorthand, "dual federalism" reified the enumerated cate-
gories of congressional competence as separate things. State and 
federal legislative directives applied to the same subject matter 
then had to be posited as assertions of different "powers." The 
Constitution thus was conceived as slicing the whole of lawmak-
ing competence into separate segments, allocated between nation 
and states. A natural corollary of this pie-slicing conception was 
that national and state governments should each be forbidden to 
nibble at the other's plate. 
The "dual-federalism" error was expressed in two ways. One 
was judicial disapproval of congressional legislation that, by deal-
ing with one of the enumerated subject matters, attempted to in-
fluence some nonenumerated matter. To the "dual federalist," 
this constituted congressional nibbling at the states' piece of pie, 
and therefore was constitutionally foreclosed. Hamilton and 
others had understood the Constitution better. Although Hamil-
ton's ambitious plan for using Congress's power in several respects 
to encourage manufactures was not enacted, Story recounted sev-
eral early examples of federal spending to promote Congress's 
policy regarding concerns extraneous to the constitutional 
enumeration. 16 Holmes merely restated Hamilton's thesis in his 
classic Hammer v. Dagenhart dissent.t7 
16. Hamilton, Report on Manufactures, ANN. OF CONG., 2d Cong., 1st Sess., 971-1034 
(1791), reprintedin3 THE WoRKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 192 (J.C. Hamilton ed. 1851); 
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES sees. 975, 977-
78, at 715, 727-28 (5th ed. 1891). 
17. 247 U.S. 251,277 (1918) (dissenting opinion). Holmes, of course, was discussing 
the principle in the context of regulations of interstate commerce, not in the context of 
spending; but the principle is generic. 
Hamilton was clear that success in achieving Congress's will on extraneous matters 
must depend wholly upon the effectiveness of the particular instrument chosen, since ac-
complishment of such extraneous ends was not ensured by the supremacy clause. See his 
Report on Manufactures, supra note 16, ANN. at 1012, 3 THE WoRKS OF ALEXANDER HAM-
ILTON at 250-51. In a neglected but important opinion, the Supreme Coun affirmed that 
state law ~ay operat.e to frustrate extraneous objectives sought by congressionally author-
IZed conditions to a license for doing interstate commerce. Regents v. Carroll, 338 U.S. 586 
(1950). The point more frequently has been acknowledged in connection with extraneous 
ends of spending measures. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,316 (1968); Oklahoma v. 
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The second expression of "dual federalism" was a revival of 
Thomas Jefferson's miserly construction of the necessary and 
proper clause. The extreme illustration is Justice Sutherland's 
1936 majority opinion in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.•s The 
Supreme Court's return toward sound constitutional thinking was 
gradual. N.L.RB. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. upheld the 
NLRA only because Chief Justice Hughes and others disregarded 
Congress's findings (which they thought transcended its powers 
under the necessary and proper clause) and construed the act nar-
rowly.J9 Only later was the classic view of the necessary and 
proper clause, as articulated by Hamilton, again clearly endorsed. 
As explained by Hamilton, the necessary and proper clause autho-
rizes Congress to make laws respecting subject matters extraneous 
to those enumerated as its "legitimate" concerns, insofar as those 
laws are reasonably deemed by Congress to be means of effectuat-
ing federal policy on some enumerated subject. 
The proper judicial role, when legislation under the necessary 
and proper clause is challenged, is to ascertain that the particular 
legislative dictate has been determined by Congress with some ra-
tional basis to be significantly conducive to some enumerated fed-
eral concern. Some examples of careless departure from this 
principle, countenancing unsupportable reaches of federal power, 
can be found among the cases, which nonetheless as a whole illus-
trate the principle well.2o Unfortunately, pervasive employment 
of the inapt idiom "affecting interstate commerce" has often con-
cealed the operation of the principle. Today, influential commen-
tators and justices alike uncritically recite that Congress has power 
to regulate activities that "affect interstate commerce," and Con-
gress has enacted a good deal oflegislation on this faulty premise. 
Some commentators even maintain that the "affecting commerce" 
principle is independent of the necessary and proper clause, and 
some present justices seem stubbornly unwilling to give fresh 
Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). See generaily Engdahl, Preemptive Capability 
of Federal Power, 45 U. COLO. L. REV. 51 (1973). 
18. 298 u.s. 238 (1936). 
19. 301 U.S. I (1937). As to the necessary and proper clause application, see espe-
cially id. at 29, 30, 34-40. 
20. For examples of Congressional overreaching, see certain particular provisions of 
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, unsupportable but upheld in Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, and Hodel v. Indiana, 452 
U.S. 314 (1981). As to some of the provisions referred to, see Engdahl, Some Observations 
on State and Federal Control of Natural Resources, 15 HousToN L. REV. 1201, 1214-18 
(1978). For a more detailed discussion of the cases applying the necessary and proper 
clause, see Engdahl, Constitutionality of the Voting Age Statute, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. I, 
8-11 (1970); Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. CoLO. L. REv. 51, 58-
62 (1973). 
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thought to the point. Others, while their thinking unfortunately is 
still encumbered by the familiar idiom, are struggling to reclarify 
the sound principle articulated by Hamilton (and by Chief Justice 
Marshall).2t They have yet to perceive, however, its most critical 
feature: that the necessary and proper clause contemplates a par-
ticularity of means. Congress does not have general legislative 
power over an extraneous subject matter merely because that mat-
ter affects interstate commerce; it has power to impose on that 
matter only particular legislative directives that are rationally 
found to be substantially conducive to some "legitimate" end-
"legitimate" in the sense of being within the scope of enumerated 
federal concerns. 
II 
With this background one can begin to see both the error of 
attributing the state immunity principle to the tenth amendment 
and the related error of denouncing it as a revival of "dual feder-
alism" thought. Rightly conceived, the principle of state immu-
nity pertains to "states" in the sense of "political communities," 
not to the power of state governments. Preservation of the power 
of state governments is the focus of "dual federalism," for whose 
exponents the tenth amendment has always been the rallying flag. 
Inspired by National League of Cities's unfortunate invocation of 
that amendment, lawyers for state governments promptly endeav-
ored to mark out certain subject matters as exclusively subject to 
state governments' power. Those efforts-which were reminiscent 
of the "dual federalism" error-failed. 
The tenth amendment merely affirms that the sovereign peo-
ple have allocated the legislative (as well as the executive and ju-
dicial) power of governance among two levels of government and 
themselves. The amendment says nothing whatever of immuni-
ties or rights. The only "right" properly viewable as inhering in 
states as sovereigns is the right of self-government; that right in-
heres in the states as political communities. The tenth amend-
ment affirms that each political community within the Union 
conferred the power of governing its members upon more than 
one set of institutions; it does not, however, confer "rights" or 
"immunities" on state governments. 
The power conferred upon the national institutions of gov-
21. For funher discussion, see Engdahl, The Federal Lands Program Under SMCRA, 
26 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. PROCEEDINGS 117, 130-31 (1981). For examples of the erro-
neous views of the commentators, see, e.g., J. NowAK, R. RoTUNDA, & J. YouNG, CoNSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 161 et seq. (2d ed. 1983); B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 95 et seq. 
(1972); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 232 et seq. (1978). 
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ernment is neither described nor delimited by the tenth amend-
ment itself. Of course, as Justice Frankfurter rightly affirmed, 
"the fact that ours is a federal constitutional system, as expressly 
recognized in the Tenth Amendment, carries with it implica-
tions."22 Those implications, however, derive not from the tenth 
amendment itself, but rather from the fact that ours is a federal 
system-a fact the amendment merely emphasizes. 
The power conferred upon the national government of course 
includes legal competence to do what is contemplated by the nec-
essary and proper clause. But such laws must be both "necessary" 
(in the Hamiltonian, not the Jeffersonian, sense) to effectuate fed-
eral policy for an enumerated subject matter, and also "proper." 
In elaboration of the latter requirement, Hamilton wrote in his 
opinion on the constitutionality of the United States Bank: 
There is also this further criterion, which may materially assist the decision: Does 
the proposed measure abridge a pre-existing right of any State or of any individ-
ual? If it does not, there is a strong presumption in favor of its constitutionality, 
and slighter relations to any declared object of the Constitution may be permilled to 
turn the scale. 23 
The phrase, "a pre-existing right of any State," must be under-
stood as referring to the rights of states as political communities, 
not to any entitlement of state governments to their own slice of 
the pie. Hamilton's point was that a stronger telic relation to some 
"declared object of the Constitution" is as appropriate when a law 
impinges upon the interests of the people as discrete political com-
munities, as when it impinges on individuals' interests.24 Chief 
Justice Marshall intimated the same point in McCulloch v. Mary-
land when he explained that to pass muster under the necessary 
and proper clause, a law must not only be adapted to an end "le-
gitimate" in the sense of being "within the scope of the constitu-
tion," but also must "consist with the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution."2s The clause contemplates that in making laws re-
garding nonenumerated subject matters, the national legislature 
must respect the spirit of federalism that pervades the entire Con-
stitution. That spirit does not reserve certain subject matters for 
governance at the state level; but it does require that the states as 
separate political communities be acknowledged, and that their 
22. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 575 (1946). 
23. Hamilton, Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the Unit~d States 
(1791), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 104, 113 (J.C. Hamilton, ed., 
1851) (emphasis added). 
24. Anything short of an absolutist application of the Bill of Rights requires judg-
ment as to the degree and seriousness of infringement, the government interests promoted 
by it, and the relation of means to end. 
25. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819) (emphasis added). 
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right as discrete communities to employ sub-national governments 
to serve their particular needs not be disregarded. 
This same spirit of the Constitution crosses the gamut of fed-
eral power even apart from the necessary and proper clause. In-
deed, the principle of state immunity was endorsed by the post-
New Deal Supreme Court thirty years before National League of 
Cities in New York v. United States,26 which involved Congress's 
power to tax. Chief Justice Stone's opinion in New York was re-
lied upon by the majority in National League of Cities. In con-
trast, Justice Brennan's National League of Cities dissent declared 
New York distinguishable as a "tax immunity" case, and thus in-
apposite where the issue was immunity from federal regulation. 
The apposite decision from the same Term, according to Brennan, 
was Case v. Bowles,21 in which the Court upheld the application to 
a state of wartime price controls. 
Case and a companion case, Hulbert v. Twin Falls County,zs 
must indeed be considered along with New York to provide an 
accurate picture of the Supreme Court's state-immunity thinking 
in 1946. Brennan was not the first to argue that the reconciling 
principle might be that state immunity is confined to federal taxa-
tion.29 There is no more reason, however, to confine this principle 
to federal taxation than there is to confine to taxation the principle 
of the necessary and proper clause, or the principle that federal 
power over an enumerated subject matter may be exerted to influ-
ence extraneous ones. All of these are generic principles, applica-
ble to the gamut of federal power. If the state immunity principle 
were to be isolated at all, it should be confined to those instances 
where it has a textual basis, as it does in the necessary and proper 
clause. But the Court's application of the principle to federal tax-
ation is in fact an acknowledgement that it is a generic principle. 
If it applies to federal taxation, despite the lack of any textual ba-
sis, then its application in cases like National League of Cities, 
where it has a textual basis, seems to be a fortiori. One is im-
pelled, therefore, to seek some better reconciliation of the 1946 
cases. 
When the several opinions in New York v. United States are 
examined, and compared with the opinions in Case and Hulbert, it 
appears that most of the eight participating justices supported a 
26. 326 u.s. 572 (1946). 
27. 327 u.s. 92 (1946). 
28. 327 u.s. 103 (1946). 
29. See, e.g., Justice Stone's dicta in United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 
(1936), branded "simply wrong" by the majority in Nalional League ofCilies, 426 U.S. at 
855. 
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principle of state immunity fundamentally like that applied in Na-
tional League of Cities. All eight agreed that precedent required 
upholding the federal tax as applied to New York's sale of min-
eral waters. Two justices (Douglas and Black) maintained that 
those precedents should be overruled, and that all state activity 
and state property should be held immune from federal taxes.Jo 
(One of those, Douglas, dissented also in Case and in Hulbert, as 
he did twenty-two years later in Maryland v. Wirt.z3t-in each 
case expressing state immunity views consistent with the later de-
cision in National League of Cities.) The other six were unwilling 
to overrule the precedents, but they all thought the existing rule 
needed refinement. Their attempts to articulate a test suggest the 
outlines of a sensible state immunity principle. 
The precedents of that day were the product of case-by-case 
contraction of the extravagant tax immunity doctrine developed in 
the late nineteenth century, adjusting it to the newly expanded in-
volvement of the states in business-like ventures.32 In South Caro-
lina v. United States, for example, the Court had declared that 
"the exemption of state agencies and instrumentalities from Na-
tional taxation is limited to those which are of a strictly govern-
mental character, and does not extend to those which are used by 
the State in the carrying on of an ordinary private business." The 
Court in that case had noted the analogy between this revised doc-
trine of tax immunity and the governmental/proprietary dichot-
omy developed to determine the tort liability of municipal 
corporations.33 
In his opinion, joined by Justice Rutledge, Justice Frank-
furter reviewed and discarded as untenable several such verbal 
dichotomies: governmental versus proprietary, governmental ver-
sus trading, historically sanctioned versus novel, and usual-gov-
ernmental-functions versus activities-conducted-merely-for-profit. 
Frankfurter found it sufficient for disposing of the case then 
before him to apply a nondiscrimination rule: Congress could not 
tax state activities while leaving untaxed the same activities pur-
sued by private individuals, but could "include the States in levy-
ing a tax exacted equally from private persons upon the same 
subject matter."34 
30. 326 U.S. at 590-98 (dissenting opinion). 
31. 392 U.S. 183, 201 et seq. (1968) (dissenting opinion). 
32. See Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REV. 
633 (1945). 
33. 199 u.s. 437, 461-63 (1905). 
34. 326 U.S. at 575-76, 584. Rutledge, while joining in Frankfurter's opinion, con-
fided separately that he would support a rule of statutory construction requiring an explicit 
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Chief Justice Stone, whose opinion was joined by Justices 
Reed, Murphy, and Burton, was no less dissatisfied with the ver-
bal formulations employed by the precedents. These justices, 
however, found unacceptable Frankfurter's rule that would allow 
any nondiscriminatory federal tax. The reason a mere nondis-
crimination rule is insufficient, they argued, "is that a Federal tax 
which is not discriminatory as to the subject matter may neverthe-
less so affect the State, merely because it is a State that is being 
taxed, as to interfere unduly with the State's performance of its 
sovereign functions of government."3s Although Justice Frank-
furter primarily relied upon the antidiscrimination rule, he also 
expressly acknowledged a rule of immunity of "the State as a 
State," apart from discrimination. He declared that 
there are, of course, State activities and State-owned property that partake of uni-
queness from the point of view of inter-governmental relations. These inherently 
constitute a class by themselves. Only a State can own a Statehouse; only a State 
can get income by taxing. These could not be included for purposes of federal 
taxation in any abstract category of taxpayers without taxing the State as a 
State.36 
Of course there is no private statehouse; but a statehouse is real 
property. By foreclosing the inclusion of this property in any "ab-
stract category," Frankfurter must be understood to preclude not 
only a federal tax upon statehouses eo nomine, but also the appli-
cation to statehouses of a nondiscriminatory federal tax upon real 
property of whatever kind. 
All six of the majority justices in New York v. United States, 
therefore, agreed that some principle of immunity insulates "the 
state as a state."J7 Of the two dissenters, Douglas at least sup-
ported the same view as to regulations as well as to taxes.Js All 
eight rejected the verbal dichotomies attempted in earlier cases. 
The difference among the six in the majority was only that Frank-
furter, while admitting the principle, declined to make as elabo-
rate an attempt at new illumination. 
Once the verbal dichotomies of the earlier cases are repudi-
ated, it is difficult to conceive of any simpler way than Stone's of 
stating the state immunity principle. Stone's opinion refers re-
peatedly to the concept of "undue interference," "undue infringe-
ment," or "undue impairment." Frankfurter expressed discomfort 
declaration to that effect from Congress before a generally applicable tax could be applied 
to a state. /d. at 585. 
35. Id. at 587. 
36. Id. at 582. 
37. 326 U.S. at 582. 
38. See the dissents of Douglas in Case and Hulbert, 327 U.S. at 105, and in Mary-
land v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968). 
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with this approach, which he thought "brings fiscal and political 
factors into play," entailing "issues that do not lend themselves to 
judgment by criteria and methods of reasoning that are within the 
professional training and special competence of judges."39 But 
the sort of judgment Stone called for does not differ from that 
commonly made on other constitutional questions, regarding "un-
due burdens" upon interstate commerce, or equal protection con-
straints on legislation. Even Frankfurter's antidiscrimination rule 
did not avoid the necessity for case-by-case judgment; for as he 
acknowledged, " 'discrimination' is not a code of specifics but a 
continuous process of application."40 As Stone observed of his 
"undue interference" concept, "[t]he problem is not one to be 
solved by a formula, but we may look to the structure of the Con-
stitution as our guide to decision."4t 
While the opinion in Case v. Bowles did re-emphasize the ste-
rility of the verbal dichotomies of the older cases, it did not repu-
diate New Yor/Cs endorsement of immunity for the "state as a 
state." Out of context, some of the language at the end of the Case 
opinion, because it is written in Justice Black's inimitable absolu-
tist style, could be read as flatly repudiating any possible state im-
munity limitation on the necessary and proper clause.42 Perhaps 
Black and even one or two of the others did conceive of the state 
immunity principle as limited to federal taxes. But there is also 
language in Case immediately preceding Black's absolutist 
phrases, reflecting the judgment required by Stone's concept of 
"undue interference." This language stresses the urgent war pur-
pose behind the federal price control legislation, and points out 
that an exemption for the states "would impair a prime purpose of 
the Federal government's establishment."43 
The "state as a state" formulation employed by all six of the 
majority justices in New York can be faulted only for its omission 
of a further refinement: an explanation of the sense in which the 
term "state" is being used. Amici in the New York case had ar-
gued that "both the state and the Federal governments are sover-
eign in their spheres."44 Unfortunately, even Chief Justice Stone's 
opinion gave unwarranted countenance to this "dual federalism" 
view. He spoke of taxes that might "interfere unduly with the 
State's performance of its sovereign functions of government," of 
39. 326 U.S. at 581. 
40. Id at 583. 
41. Id at 589. 
42. That Black was contemplating the necessary and proper clause is evident from his 
citation to McCulloch. 327 U.S. at 102. 
43. 327 U.S. at 102. 
44. 90 L. Ed. at 328. 
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taxes impermissible "because a sovereign government is the tax-
payer," and of taxes unduly infringing "the performance of its 
functions as a government which the Constitution recognizes as 
sovereign."4s The Constitution, however, does not recognize the 
states' governments as sovereign; its postulate is that the people 
are sovereign, and as such-arrayed in their respective "political 
communities"--entitled to self-government. One might wish that 
Chief Justice Stone had studied the distinction drawn by his pred-
ecessor Chase in Texas v. White before writing his opinion in New 
York. 
In this respect, Justice Rehnquist's opinion in National 
League of Cities is only somewhat less to be faulted. On the one 
hand, Rehnquist did take care to make the point that state immu-
nity does not preserve any realms of citizen behavior exclusively 
for state control.46 On the other hand, even in the same passage, 
Rehnquist spoke of "the dual sovereignty of the government of the 
Nation and of the State," and referred to "attributes of sover-
eignty attaching to every state government."47 Elsewhere, he re-
ferred to "the States in their capacities as sovereign 
governments."4s 
It is not surprising that Rehnquist's opinion was misunder-
stood by so many as reviving "dual federalism" thought. For the 
same reason, it was most appropriate for Justice Blackmun to sep-
arately express his correct understanding of the Court's opinion. 
If Rehnquist's expressions are taken in context, however, it seems 
clear enough that National League of Cities protects, not any pur-
ported sovereign rights of state governments as such, but rather 
the integrity of state political communities, and their right to 
maintain institutions capable of serving their needs without undue 
interference from the national institutions. The more apt expres-
sions are found in those passages of Rehnquist's opinion pro-
testing "forced relinquishment of important governmental 
activities" that those political communities expect to be per-
formed, and objecting to "congressionally imposed displacement" 
of state decisions and policies regarding the delivery of services. 
In this sense, administration of the law and the providing of other 
public services can be considered "integral governmental func-
tions" of the states-not as species of power reserved to the states 
as sovereign governments, but rather as functions that the inde-
structible political communities called "states" are entitled to have 
45. 326 U.S. at 587-88. 
46. 426 U.S. at 845. 
47. Id at 844-45 (emphasis added). 
48. Id at 852. 
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performed by their peculiar institutions without "undue" interfer-
ence. It is in this sense, as a separate "political community," that 
a state is "a coordinate element in the system established by the 
Framers," and not merely a factor in the "shifting economic ar-
rangements" within the nation.49 
It was no absolute or wooden rule of immunity that National 
League of Cities endorsed. Blackmun was correct in understand-
ing the Court's opinion (which he joined) as adopting a balancing 
approach.so The principle is not so inflexible as to foreclose appli-
cation to the states of all federal regulations. As Justice Douglas 
put it, presaging National League of Cities in his Maryland v. Wirtz 
dissent, application of the state immunity principle "depends on 
the facts."st A carefully considered case-by-case judgment must 
be made, properly based in part on "the degree of intrusion upon 
the protected area of state ["political community"] sovereignty."s2 
The lesser degree and temporariness of the intrusion was one 
point distinguishing the wage freeze upheld in Fry v. United 
States. The judgment is also properly based on the urgency of the 
federal purpose, another factor in Fry. Considering these factors, 
the wage freeze challenged in Fry was judged not to "impair[] the 
States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal 
system."sJ A like judgment might very well be made, as Justice 
Blackmun suggested in dictum, with regard to environmental 
protection. 54 
In National League of Cities, as contrasted with Fry, the ma-
jority's considered judgment was that in the absence of any com-
parable urgency, such displacement of "the States' freedom to 
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental 
functions" did not "comport with the federal system of govern-
ment embodied in the Constitution."ss The same point made long 
ago by Hamilton was reiterated by Rehnquist in National League 
of Cities: The degree or clarity of the relation sufficient under the 
necessary and proper clause to support a measure as applied to 
private entities is not necessarily sufficient to support it as applied, 
"not to private citizens, but to the States as States."s6 Chief Jus-
tice Stone had contemplated a similar sort of judgment when he 
49. Jd at 847. 849, 851, 855. 
50. Jd at 856. 
51. 392 U.S. at 205. 
52. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852. 
53. Fry, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975); see 426 U.S. at 852-53, 856. 
54. 426 U.S. at 856. 
55. Jd at 852. 
56. 426 U.S. at 845. 
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spoke of federal interference or infringement which might be con-
sidered "undue." 
Justice Brennan, dissenting in National League of Cities, in-
sisted that the judiciary has no business making such judgments at 
all: 
It is unacceptable that the judicial process should be thought superior to the 
political process in this area [citing Wickard v. Filbum51]. . . . 
Judicial restraint in this area merely recognizes that the political branches of 
our Government are structured to protect the interests of the States, as well as the 
Nation as a whole, and that the States are fully able to protect their own interests 
in the premises .... [Judicial involvement in this area) violates the fundamental 
tenet of our federalism that the extent of federal intervention into the States' af-
fairs . . . shall be determined by the States' exercise of political power through 
their representatives in Congress. See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Fed-
eralism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 Col. L. Rev. 543 (1954).58 
Brennan's adamant assertion was wrong on two grounds. 
First, his reliance upon Wickard v. Filburn was misplaced. 
Certainly, effective restraints on Congress's policy for interstate 
commerce must be political rather than judicial, as said by the 
Wickard Court. What was at issue in Wickard, however, was not 
interstate commerce but rather the validity, under the necessary 
and proper clause, of federal acreage allotments for production as 
a means to the Congressional policy about prices of grain sold in 
interstate commerce. The Court in Wickard distinguished the is-
sues, said it was applying the necessary and proper clause,s9 and 
carefully tested the production control measure under that clause. 
The necessary and proper clause does allow great latitude to Con-
gress in the choice of means, but the latitude is bounded by the 
clause's terms, which the judiciary must independently apply. As 
to Congress's policy for what the judiciary agrees to be interstate 
commerce, restraints on policy are to be sought in the political 
process, but as to controls on production as a means to effectuate 
that policy, the judiciary must be satisfied that the means are both 
necessary and proper to the commerce clause end. 
Second, Brennan's reliance upon Professor Wechsler's article 
was misplaced. Wechsler's observations were published a genera-
tion ago in 1954, and however cogent they might have been then, 
they are plainly anachronistic now. When Wechsler wrote, it was 
still accurate to call national action "exceptional," "fragmentary," 
and "ad hoc."60 By the early 1970's, a new outpouring of social 
57. 317 U.S. ill, 120 (1942). 
58. 426 U.S. at 876-77. 
59. 317 U.S. at 119 & n.l5, 121, 125. 
60. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
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legislation from Congress, unanticipated when Wechsler wrote, 
had created over a thousand categorical grant programs involving 
billions of dollars, radically warping operations of the states. To-
day Congress interests itself in everything from the training of 
medical technicians and the housing of cats and dogs held for 
medical experiments, to disclosure of consumer credit terms, local 
law enforcement records, local possession of firearms by convicted 
felons, and health hazards from asbestos insulation in public 
schools.6t While it remains generally true that "Congress acts ... 
against the background of the total corpus juris of the states," it 
seems there is no longer "a burden of persuasion on those favor-
ing national intervention."62 On the contrary, the presumption on 
which Congress now operates seems to be that virtually every sig-
nificant grievance of their constituency warrants a federal remedy. 
Wechsler also relied heavily upon the states' "crucial role in 
the selection and the composition of the national authority," par-
ticularly Congress. As to the House, Wechsler relied on the states' 
"control of voters' qualifications, on the one hand, and of district-
ing, on the other." Today, reapportionment litigation and voting 
rights legislation have changed the basic rules of politics. One sig-
nificant illustration of state control over composition of the electo-
rate, according to Wechsler, was the poll tax. He thought 
legislation to abolish the tax had "no real prospect,"63 but ten 
years later the twenty-fourth amendment was adopted. Subse-
quently, the minimum voting age was lowered by federal legisla-
tion, upheld as valid with respect to the election of representatives 
and other federal officials64 even before the twenty-sixth amend-
ment. Today, states have nothing like the role in shaping the elec-
torate for representatives that they had in 1954. 
Even the Senate today does not function, as Wechsler per-
ceived in a different day, "as the guardian of state interests as 
such."6s Too great a departure from the policy prescriptions of 
their national political parties or other national interest groups 
can cost senators crucial endorsements, volunteer assistance, and 
financial support. Corporate enterprise and organized labor are 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 544, 545 
(1954). 
61. For the relevant statutes, see 7 U.S.C. 2131, 15 U.S.C. 1601, 18 U.S.C. 1201, 20 
U.S.C. 3601, 42 U.S.C. 10001, 26 U.S.C. 5801, 5812. See generally Conyers, The Politics of 
Revenue Sharing, 52 J. URBAN L. 61, 76-77 (1974); Gribbs, The New Federalism Is Here To 
Stay, id. at 55, 56-57. 
62. Wechsler, supra note 60, at 545. 
63. For the quoted passages, see id. at 546, 548, 549. See generally id. at 548-52. 
64. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
65. Wechsler, supra note 60, at 548. See generally id. at 547-48. 
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better represented in Congress today than any single state or even 
the collective interests of "the states as states." So are a host of 
other interest groups with persuasive lobbyists and large cam-
paign funds. The states-those political communities that the 
Constitution contemplates as the building blocks of the Union-
are today in no sense the constituency of any elected national offi-
cial. Wechsler's hypothesis of state dominance in the national leg-
islative process, ventured thirty years ago, today is little more than 
a fairy tale. 
III 
Application of the state immunity principle necessarily calls 
for judgment. The trustworthiness of judgment, however, de-
pends greatly on the clarity with which an issue is perceived. Ju-
dicial analysis in the post-National League of Cities era has been 
hampered by the "three-pronged test" articulated in the Hodel 
case.66 The first prong of that "test" wholly omits to elucidate 
what sense of the term "state" is being used. The second prong, 
drawn from a sentence in National League of Cities that refers to 
"attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government," 
actually misdirects the inquiry, focusing attention upon govern-
ment powers rather than upon the interests of the political com-
munities, and thus inviting repetition of the dual federalism error. 
The third prong exhumes one of the unhelpful dichotomies rightly 
buried in New York by referring to "traditional governmental 
functions." In short, the "three-pronged test" serves to solidify the 
worst shortcomings of the National League of Cities opinion. 
What should be the crucial inquiry is alluded to in Hodel only in a 
footnote: whether the states' integrity as viable "political commu-
nities" is "unduly" infringed by application of the federal measure 
involved.67 
Every state immunity case thus far adjudicated by the 
Supreme Court since National League of Cities has involved-as 
did National League of Cities itself-federal regulatory schemes 
based upon the necessary and proper clause, designed to effectuate 
federal policy with regard to the enumerated subject matter of in-
terstate commerce. Repeatedly, however, the analysis at least by 
several of the justices has been crippled by the commonplace fail-
ure to distinguish between the commerce clause and the necessary 
and proper clause. In the Hodel cases, there was good ground to 
66. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 
(1981). 
67. 452 U.S. at 288 n.29. 
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question the necessary and proper clause basis for several provi-
sions of the law in question, wholly apart from any state immunity 
contention.6s But assuming no such defect, it is clear that no state 
immunity objection could be sustained; only an immunity argu-
ment confounding the states, as political communities, with the 
power over citizens that might be exercised by their governments 
could be made, thus reviving the "dual federalism" error. 
The unanimous opinion in United Transportation Union v. 
Long Island Rail Road Company69 was written by Chief Justice 
Burger, a member of the National League of Cities majority. His 
opinion reflects somewhat greater awareness that the federal law 
there in question, the Railway Labor Act, rests on the necessary 
and proper clause and not on the commerce clause per se.1o Nev-
ertheless, the opinion is skewed by the use of the three-pronged 
test.7t UTUwas actually an easy case. The state had acquired the 
railroad with full awareness that it operated under a longstanding, 
comprehensive scheme of federal regulation, and had acquiesced 
in that regulatory scheme for some thirteen years. Certainly, any 
purported interference with the state government's preferred ap-
proach to labor relations could not be considered "undue." 
FERC v. Mississippin was a much closer case. Here, the ma-
jority's failure to distinguish between the commerce clause and the 
necessary and proper clause had a very serious effect. The lower 
court and the state had relied upon the hopeless contention that 
Congress has no power to govern electric utilities because their 
activities are not interstate commerce. Of course Congress can 
68. None of the justices, however, surmounted the confusion engendered by the '"af-
fecting interstate commerce" idiom sufficiently to rediscover the now long-obscured "par-
ticularity" requirement of the necessary and proper clause. Justice Rehnquist and Chief 
Justice Burger lamented the purported "fiction" of the doctrine that Congress exercises 
only the power delegated to it; but although they were obviously deeply disturbed at not 
finding a better ground for doubt, they did no more than emphasize the "substantiality" 
requirement of the traditional necessary and proper clause construction. It did not occur to 
them to emphasize that the clause only supports particular regulations of extraneous mat-
ters, and only insofar as those particular regulations are rationally found to substantially 
conduce to some interstate commerce policy end. Some of the multitudinous provisions of 
the Surface Mining Act satisfy this particularity requirement; but others seem to fail. What 
policy for interstate commerce, for example, can be promoted by prohibiting surface min-
ing close to churches and schools? The congressional history of the Surface Mining Act 
does not show a particularized consideration of need for each of the numerous controls 
imposed; all it shows is that surface mining affects interstate commerce in a variety of ways, 
as if that could make every facet of the enterprise, without any more particularized inquiry, 
amenable to federal control The necessary and proper clause justifies no such thing. 
69. 455 u.s. 678 (1982). 
70. See id at 688. 
71. Thus he found it necessary to disavow "a static historical view," id at 686, and to 
erect as a counterweight the notion of "areas traditionally subject to federal statutory regu-
lation," id at 687. 
72. 456 u.s. 742 (1982). 
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regulate them in a multitude of ways, even as to activities that are 
not interstate commerce, by virtue of the necessary and proper 
clause. The majority, however, discussed it as a "commerce 
clause" case. Compounding this error, the majority relied on an 
ipse dixit from Hodel: "It is established beyond peradventure that 
'legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic 
life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality.' "73 
The cases cited in support of this proposition involved only pur-
ported due process constraints on economic regulations. Under 
the necessary and proper clause, however, the maximum allowa-
ble "presumption of constitutionality" is that long ago articulated 
by Hamilton: "strong presumption in favor of its constitutional-
ity" under that clause may be indulged only if it does not "abridge 
a pre-existing right of any State [in the sense of a "political com-
munity"] or of any individual." This makes the immunity ques-
tion integral to "propriety" under that clause. The merger of the 
commerce clause and necessary and proper clause issues worked 
mischief in the FERC Court's analysis, for it applied the so-called 
"tenth amendment" standard of National League of Cities only af-
ter it had first satisfied itself that the regulations involved were 
within Congress' power under the commerce clause. Instead of 
treating it correctly as integral to the necessary and proper clause 
inquiry, therefore, the majority treated the state immunity issue as 
an afterthought. 
What was unique about the legislation challenged in FERC v. 
Mississippi was its attempt "to use state regulatory machinery to 
advance federal goals." To an extent, this "presents an issue of 
first impression.''74 Somewhat comparable regulations had been 
conceded by the government to be unconstitutional just a year af-
ter National League of Cities,75 but Congress had since grown 
more bold. 
There was no dissent from that part of the FERC opinion 
upholding federal authority to encourage cogeneration and small 
power production facilities and to exempt such facilities from state 
regulation. And no wonder, because those provisions were merely 
valid "necessary and proper" governance of the production activi-
ties of utilities for commerce clause policy ends, intruding not at 
all on the integrity of the states. Four justices, however, dissented 
from upholding provisions that prescribed administrative and ju-
73. 452 U.S. at 323; 456 U.S. at 754. 
74. ld at 759. 
75. See EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). 
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dicial procedures to be followed by state regulatory institutions.76 
The majority thought it sufficient to uphold these provisions that 
Congress could have preempted entirely the state's role in electric 
utility regulation. Concededly, Congress could have done so, but 
the fact is that it did not. Instead it demanded state compliance 
with the prescribed procedures, and did not even establish a 
backup federal machinery to which the regulatory function could 
default if a state should elect the option posited by the majority of 
"abandoning regulation of the field altogether."77 The dissenters 
perceived this as equivalent to superseding "state-court rules of 
civil procedure and judicial review" in cases over which federal 
tribunals could have been given exclusive jurisdiction.7s They de-
cried the statute as an attempt to "conscript state utility commis-
sions into the national bureaucratic army,"79 on a theory that 
"could reduce the States to federal provinces."so Their concern 
may have been somewhat exaggerated, since the prescribed proce-
dures were not shown in that case to "expand[] on [Mississippi's] 
existing, liberal approach to public participation in ratemaking."si 
Three justicess2 also dissented from upholding the require-
ment that state regulatory commissions "consider" a federally 
suggested set of standards relating to the terms and conditions of 
electricity service.sJ The majority upheld these provisions primar-
ily by analogy to Testa v. Katt.s4 There is no doubt that the "dual 
federalism" based holding of Kentucky v. Dennison,ss relied upon 
by Mississippi, was wrong and should be flatly overruled-as 
much as that in Carter Coal, upon which Mississippi also relied. 
But the analogy to Testa v. Katt does not hold. There, state insti-
tutions were not enlisted to do the federal government's bidding; 
the Court merely enforced the supremacy of valid federal law 
where applicable to cases within the state courts' state-prescribed 
jurisdiction and procedures. Dictating the agendas of state insti-
tutions erected by political communities to perform functions for 
their own welfare at least verges upon being an "undue" interfer-
ence with the states' integrity, and risks reducing their institutions 
to "field offices of the national bureaucracy" or "think tanks to 
76. See Powell's dissent, 456 U.S. at 771, and O'Connor's dissent, joined by Burger 
and Rehnquist, id at 775. 
77. 456 U.S. at 766. 
78. ld at 774 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
79. ld at 775 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
80. ld at 773 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
81. ld at 769. 
82. O'Connor, joined by Burger and Rehnquist. ld at 775. 
83. ld at 747-48. 
84. 330 u.s. 386 (1947). 
85. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861). 
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which Congress may assign problems for extended study."s6 
Nonetheless, whether these provisions constitute "undue" in-
terference with "the states as states" is properly a matter of judg-
ment; and on matters of judgment, judicial minds must be 
expected to differ. Only about half of the current justices, how-
ever, seem to have any grasp of the sensible state immunity princi-
ple and the questions for judgment that it frames.87 Among the 
FERC majority were some justices who adamantly insist that no 
judicial judgment on the critical issues should even be made; one 
can be confident only as to Justice Blackmun that any judgment 
on the material issues, whether sound or unsound, was even 
attempted. 
The latest state immunity decision is EEOC v. Wyoming.ss 
That case involved the 1974 extension of the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (ADEA) to cover employees of state and local 
governments.s9 Justice Brennan, the prime dissenter in National 
League of Cities, wrote for the majority, and again confused the 
commerce clause and the necessary and proper clause. Although 
he employed the unhelpful "three-pronged test" formulated by his 
fellow National League of Cities opponent, Marshall, in Hodel, his 
opinion does contain one redeeming perception. He acknowl-
edged that "[t]he principle of immunity articulated in National 
League of Cities is a functional doctrine . . . whose ultimate pur-
pose is ... to ensure that the unique benefits of a federal system 
... not be lost through undue federal interference .... " "We 
conclude," he wrote, "that the degree of federal intrusion in this 
case is sufficiently less serious than it was in National League of 
Cities so as to make it unnecessary for us to override Congress's 
express choice to extend its regulatory authority to the States." 
Brennan might be faulted for his assertion that the inquiry called 
for is "essentially legal rather than factual";90 for one might well 
argue that the difference in outcome between Maryland v. Wirtz 
and National League of Cities is attributable at least in part to the 
far more extensive detailing of the purported factual impact in 
86. 456 U.S. at 777 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
87. Some seem opposed to performing this essential judicial role at all; see, e.g., the 
dissent of Justice Stevens from the grant of leave to file an original complaint in South 
Carolina v. Regan, 52 U.S.L.W. 4232, 4245 (1984). 
88. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983). 
89. Here the nonsense resulting from failure to distinguish between commerce clause 
and necessary and proper clause issues was made most apparent in Justice Stevens' concur-
~g opini?n, id at 1~, which was fittingly answered by Justice Powell's supplemental 
dissent, JOmed by Justice O'Connor, id at 1075. 
. ~· See id at 1060 (emph~is a~ded), 1062 (emphasis added), 1063. Again, "[n]othing 
m this case ... portends anything like the same wide-ranging and profound threat to the 
structure of State governance." Jd at 1062. 
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National League of Cities. Beyond that, one might simply disagree 
(as did the dissenters) with the judgment that Brennan made on 
the question of degree. 
The principal dissent was written by Chief Justice Burger, 
and joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Burger 
applied the "three-pronged test" and then passed to the "balanc-
ing" judgment that really is the heart of the principle. But the 
dissent was weakened by failure to distinguish sharply between 
the commerce and necessary and proper clauses. The significant 
fact that Congress, in the ADEA, "has not placed similar limits on 
itself' could have been made much more forceful. As Hamilton 
explained, the necessary and proper clause requires more urgent 
"legitimate" (e.g., interstate commerce policy) objectives and a 
clearer telic relation when the federal measure "abridge[s] a pre-
existing right of any State," in the sense of a political commu-
nity-such as the right of those communities to expect of their 
own local governments the most effective possible law enforce-
ment and fire protection. That Congress had explicitly excluded 
federal law enforcement personnel belies any assertion that cover-
age of similar state officials was clearly and closely related to any 
urgent federal purpose.9t 
The ADEA has been upheld by some lower federal courts 
under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment.92 
The EEOC Court specifically declined to decide whether the en-
forcement clause applied;93 but th~ dissenting justices discussed 
the point and it deserves discussion here. Congress's power to en-
force, "by appropriate legislation," the post-Civil War amend-
ments, is very substantial and very important. Unfortunately, it 
also has been very much misunderstood. 
The dissenting opinion in EEOC gave the enforcement clause 
a construction that in one respect is too narrow. It is not quite 
true that "Congress may act only where a violation lurks"94-at 
least if this means that a constitutional violation must already 
have occurred. Congress's power extends to prophylaxis against 
violations that otherwise might occur, whether or not they actually 
have occurred.9s Thus Congress could have acted to prevent age 
discrimination by states, even if only as a safeguard against possi-
91. See 103 S. Ct. at 1070. 
92. See, e.g., Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); Carpenter v. Peru:'-
sylvania Liquor Control Bd., 508 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1981); EEOC v. Pe~ylvarua 
Liquor Control Bd., 503 F. Supp. 1051 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Marshall v. Delaware River & Bay 
Authority, 471 F. Supp. 886 (D. Del. 1979). 
93. 103 S. Ct. at 1064. 
94. ld at 1072-73. 
95. That was the point of the first rationale employed in the Court's opinion in Kat-
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ble discrimination that had nowhere yet actually occurred, !(age 
discrimination were prohibited by the equal protection clause. 
The "if," however, is cruciaJ.96 
As the Court repeatedly has noted, the enforcement clauses 
are analogous to the necessary and proper clause. This analogy 
necessitates application of the state immunity principle under the 
enforcement clauses. The adjective "appropriate," used in the en-
forcement clauses, subsumes both the concept of "necessary" (in 
the generous Hamiltonian sense) and the concept of "proper" 
(also as illuminated by Hamilton and Chief Justice Marshall). 
Here again, in other words, there is a textual-basis for application 
of the state immunity principle.97 
This principle, however, operates somewhat differently with 
respect to the enforcement clauses, because the substantive provi-
sions of most of the amendments containing enforcement clauses 
are themselves constraints upon the "states." It is "states," for ex-
ample, that are ordered not to "deny ... the equal protection of 
the laws," or to deny or abridge voting rights on account of race. 
It might persuasively be argued that these prohibitions apply not 
only to state governments but to the states themselves as political 
communities. Indeed, that seems to have been the understanding 
of the Congress that drafted the fourteenth amendment. Virtually 
contemporaneous statutes prescribe both criminal penalties and 
civil remedies with regard to violations of these constitutional 
rights whether accomplished under color of law, or merely by vir-
zenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-53 (1966); and there was nothing novel about the 
proposition even at that time. 
96. The second rationale articulated by Justice Brennan in his opinion for the Court 
in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653-54, was erroneous for overlooking this point. 
Fifteen years ago this portentious second rationale had constitutional academia all agog, as 
it suggested congressional rather than judicial authority over the scope of constitutional 
rights. Among other things, it was the purported basis on which legislation to lower the 
voting age was enacted. See Engdahl, Constitutionality of the Voting Age Statute, 39 GEo. 
WAsH. L. REv. I, 2-3 (1970). When that legislation was tested in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 
U.S. 112 (1970), the justices recognized that this second rationale is really an avulsion of the 
judiciary's prerogative of independent constitutional construction; and not one of the jus-
tices applied it (although Brennan did advance a slightly more credible variation, 400 U.S. 
at 229). Since Oregon the Supreme Court has given no credence to the notion that Con-
gress can define the substance of constitutional rights. 
97. The dissenters in Wyoming failed to make the point in this way, and instead ar-
gued much less persuasively that the tenth amendment "was not, after all repealed when 
the fourteenth amendment was ratified: it was merely limited" so that Congress does not 
have "a 'blank check' to intrude into details of states' governments at will" in acting under 
the enforcement clause. 103 S. Ct. at 1072. This is unpersuasive because, as already noted, 
the tenth amendment says nothing whatever that can be construed as delimiting or restrict-
ing any delegated federal power, unless the "dual federalism" error is resurrected. It is the 
language of the enforcement clauses themselves, and not the tenth amendment, that in-
vokes the state immunity principle. 
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tue of "custom" or "usage."9s Moreover, a "denial" may be ac-
complished as much by failing (for whatever reason) to afford the 
protection required, as by affirmatively taking it away; a suppli-
cant is as much "denied" the bread he seeks when it is merely 
withheld from him, as when it is snatched from his hands. This, 
too, seems to have been the original intent.99 Resort to attenuated 
theories of "state action," in the sense of governmental involve-
ment, might be considerably lessened if more careful thought were 
given to the sense in which the term "state" is used in these 
amendments. Even greater latitude for congressional enforcement 
might be appropriate on the view suggested here. 
In any event, the enforcement clauses do require a judgment 
as to "appropriateness." If that judgment is analogous to that re-
quired under the necessary and proper clause, it must include in-
quiry not only into whether the enforcement measure seems 
rationally adapted to effectuate the legitimate end, but also into 
whether it "unduly" infringes the integrity of the state as an inde-
structible political community. What degree of infringement is 
"appropriate," and at what point the infringement might become 
"undue," might well be judged differently where the congressional 
objective is to ensure individual rights. But there is a judgment of 
constitutional dimension to be made. 
The state immunity principle is applicable, for example, in 
determining the appropriate remedy for a civil rights violation. 
Even though a state's fiscal resources are not insulated from inva-
sion to remedy civil rights violations, 100 monetary relief should be 
98. Civil Rights Act of 1866, sec. 2, as amended, 18 U.S.C. sec. 242; Ku Klux Klan 
Act of 1871, sec. I, as amended, 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. 
99. Section 3 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 provided that when "the constituted 
authorities" of a state, in the face of private combinations or violence, "shall either be 
unable to protect, or shall, from any cause, fail in or refuse protection of the people in" any 
of the rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution, "such facts shall be 
deemed a denial by such State of the equal protection of the laws to which they are entitled 
under the Constitution" (emphasis added). The Enforcement Act of 1870, sees. 2 & 3, also 
imposed obligations of affirmative action upon state officials. 
100. A state cannot claim immunity from suit in a federal forum for purported viola-
tions of constitutional rights. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). But amenability to 
suit has nothing to do with the state immunity principle here under discussion. Notwith-
standing Justice Marshall's assertion to the contrary in his majority opinion in Rome v. 
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980), Fitzpatrick was no answer to the question reserved 
four days earlier by a footnote in National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 n.17, as _to 
whether state immunity could apply in the context of the enforcement power. Immumty 
from suit is a totally different question, turning on completely different premises. The judi-
cially contrived state immunity from suit by its own citizens, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I 
(1890), falsely attributed to the eleventh amendment, certainly should be abrogated. See 
Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 
CoL. L. REv. 1889 (1983); Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental 
Wrongs, 44 U. CoLO. L. REV. I, 28-32 (1972). Even if it were, however, the independently 
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judiciously tempered by consideration for the interests of the state 
political community as a whole. There are suggestions to this ef-
fect in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman. 101 
A graphic illustration is provided by another case, which 
seems likely within the next few years to reach the Supreme 
Court's docket. In 1982, having exhausted their administrative 
remedies, two unions and several individuals brought a class ac-
tion against the State of Washington and some of its agencies in a 
federal district court, alleging sex discrimination in the state's 
wage systems for classified employees. They relied upon a "com-
parable worth" interpretation of Title VII, which as amended in 
1972 prohibits discrimination by states as well as other employers 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. On 
December 14, 1983, the district court ruled in favor of the plain-
tiffs, ordering sweeping prospective relief and also awarding 
"back pay" to members of the represented class.102 An appeal is 
now pending in the Ninth Circuit. 
For present purposes, it may be assumed that the "compara-
ble worth" construction of Title VII is valid, and that the order for 
prospective monetary relief (approximately $130 million per year) 
can stand. The "back pay" awarded, however, totals just short of 
$561 million. The State of Washington operates on a biennial 
budget of approximately $8 billion; but nearly half of this sum 
goes to fund basic education, and another twenty-five percent is 
required to fund pensions and other social and health services. 
The remaining $1 billion per year funds all other government op-
erations and services, including higher education. Washington's 
state constitution prohibits deficit spending, prohibits raising 
property taxes above a certain level, and prohibits imposition of 
an income tax. Public initiatives have eliminated inheritance 
taxes and the sales tax as applied to food. The state's primary 
revenue sources are sales taxes and business and occupation taxes; 
recent shortfalls in the revenues from these sources prompted the 
derived principle of state immunity here under discussion would nonetheless remain for 
judicial application. 
101. 451 U.S. I (1981). Pennhursl was decided a year after Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 
U.S. I ( 1980), had held that 42 U .S.C. sec. 1983 gives a cause of action to enforce statutory 
as well as constitutional rights. While the Halderman majority found it unnecessary to 
determine whether Thiboutot applied, one of the reasons it gave for declining to do so was 
the problem of scope of remedy that then would arise. 451 U.S. at 29-30. Still more signifi-
cant, the partial dissent in Halderman, which did declare Thiboulol applicable, suggested 
substantial restraint with regard to the remedies that properly might be ordered-restraint 
that, in essence, reflects due consideration of the general interests of the defendant state "as 
a state." 451 U.S. at 51-55. 
102. American Federation of St., Cty. & Mun. Emp. v. State of Washington, 578 F. 
Supp. 846 (W.O. Wash. 1983). 
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legislature to reduce the biennial budget by some $500 million, 
eliminating 3,000 state jobs. To generate the $561 million to sat-
isfy the "back pay" award would require a twenty-two percent 
increase in the sales tax or a fifty-five percent surtax on business 
and occupation taxes. Washington already has the nation's high-
est state sales tax, a regressive tax that hits hardest those least able 
to pay, and the existing business surtax may well already threaten 
the vitality of the state's business economy. A small portion of the 
required sum might be generated by increases in miscellaneous 
fees and taxes, such as the gasoline tax and fees for driving and 
fishing licenses. As an alternative to raising taxes, the state could 
cut all state services (including social welfare programs and the 
prison system) approximately twenty percent across the board for 
the present biennium; or, it could eliminate all state funding for 
post-secondary education; or, it could eliminate all state funding 
for medical care and nursing homes. Merely eliminating the 
state's entire budget for welfare programs would fall more than 
$200 million short of producing the needed sum. 
In the district court, the state's attorneys argued that the tenth 
amendment precluded the award of "back pay" relief, relying 
heavily upon National League of Cities. The district judge ab-
ruptly rejected this argument with the observation that Title VII 
enforces the fourteenth amendment. It would seem, however, that 
while the attorneys for Washington could well have framed their 
argument better, the judge's response was too facile. The impact 
of the back pay award seems far more drastic than the impacts 
postulated in National League of Cities. If protected rights were 
indeed violated, justice requires a suitable remedy, but the suita-
bility of the remedy cannot be judged without regard for its im-
pact upon the state. Unlike private entities, states cannot respond 
to such devastating financial impacts by going out of business or 
undergoing bankruptcy reorganization; they are indestructible 
components of the nation. 
This point is essentially what divided the dissenters from the 
majority in Rome v. United States.toJ That Congress has power to 
enforce the fifteenth amendment, even by prophylactic means 
somewhat in excess of those necessary, is fully consistent with the 
necessary and proper clause analogy. One cannot justify judicial 
abdication, however, simply by reciting that the Civil War amend-
ments ''were specifically designed as an expansion of federal 
power and an intrusion on state sovereignty."I04 At how great a 
103. 446 u.s. 156 (1980). 
104. Id at 179 (majority opinion). 
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price, in terms of the integrity of those political communities, the 
very worthy objectives of those amendments are to be attained 
remains a question of judgment, to be determined by the judiciary 
as particular cases are decided. Justice Powell was on solid 
ground in observing that: "[u]nless the federal structure provides 
some protection for a community's ordering of its own democratic 
procedures, the right of each community to determine its own 
course within the boundaries marked by the Constitution is at 
risk."ws True, Justice Rehnquist's discussion of the "three theo-
ries of congressional enforcement power relevant" to Rome'06 was 
not quite accurate, his reading of the precedents was a bit too re-
strictive, and he was wrong in concluding that only Brennan's dis-
credited "second rationale" in Morgan could sustain the result in 
that case. He was right, however, in observing that "[p]olitical 
theorists can readily differ on the advantages inherent in different 
governmental structures," and right in noting that our constitu-
tional system is offended when "the only values fostered [by an 
intrusion upon the states) are debatable assumptions about polit-
ical theory which should properly be left to the local democratic 
process."I07 If the decision in Rome upholding the Voting Rights 
Act as applied in that case had been based upon a majority judg-
ment on the "appropriateness" of that application of the statute, 
then the dissents could be taken only as proof that judgments on 
that critical question can differ. It is evident from the majority 
opinion, however, that at least some of the justices refused to ac-
knowledge that any such judgment must be made at all. That is a 
cardinal error, and the abdication of a judicial function as vital as 
any the courts have to perform. 
In the necessary and proper and enforcement clauses, the 
principle of state immunity has clear textual basis. But the princi-
ple is a generic one. The majority in National League of Cities had 
declined to discuss its applicability, for example, "if Congress 
seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercis-
ing authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution 
such as the spending power, Art. I, sec. 8, cl. I."ws An occasion to 
consider the state immunity principle in the context of conditions 
on federal spending arose in 1976, when Congress amended the 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act to condition reimbursement for 
the expenses of maintaining unemployment compensation pro-
grams upon states' extension of unemployment benefits coverage 
105. Id. at 201-02 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
106. Id. at 210-12. 
107. /d. at 219, 221. 
108. 426 U.S. at 852 n.l7. 
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to public employees. Projecting the impact upon state operations 
to be comparable to National League of Cities, six states and a 
multitude of subordinate governmental entities brought suit to in-
validate the new condition on that ground.I09 Unfortunately their 
lawsuit, designed by the same lead counsel who had prevailed in 
National League of Cities, was cast as a challenge to the denial of 
federal unemployment tax credits to private employers in noncon-
forming states. This writer, retained as a consultant, urgently 
warned that this effort would founder on the Tax Anti-Injunction 
Act, and advised that it be voluntarily dismissed and succeeded by 
an original action in the Supreme Court challenging not the tax 
credit denial, but the conditioning of administration grants.110 
The writer's consulting services were then abruptly terminated; 
and the case did indeed founder on the Anti-Injunction Act. III 
That opportunity squandered, all but one of the states amended 
their laws to comply. The solitary holdout was New Hampshire, 
where a bill to accomplish conformity was vetoed. When the Sec-
retary of Labor found New Hampshire out of conformity, it un-
dertook litigation on its own. The First Circuit rejected its state 
immunity contention, misreading the National League of Cities 
footnote as confining the state immunity principle to the com-
merce clause.112 
From this, some writers have overconfidently concluded that 
the state immunity principle does not apply to conditional federal 
spending schemes.m This conclusion overlooks a crucial footnote 
in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, which says, 
"[t]here are limits on the power of Congress to impose conditions 
on the States pursuant to its spending power, Steward Machine 
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S., at 585; Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 
(1974); Fullilove v. Klutznic, 448 U.S. 448 (1970) (Burger, C.J.); see 
109. Los Angeles County, et. al., v. Marshall, Civ. Action No. 77-2023 (D.D.C.). The 
plaintiff states were South Carolina, Alaska, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and 
New Mexico. The full list of plaintiffs filled 169 pages of the 520-page complaint. 
llO. An original action in the Supreme Court is the procedure now appropriately be-
ing employed, for example, in South Carolina v. Regan, 52 U.S.L.W. 4232 (1984). 
Ill. 442 F. Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1977), affd, 631 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 837 (1980). 
112. New Hampshire Department of Employment Security v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240 
(1st Cir. 1980). There were six particulars in which New Hampshire was found out of 
conformity, and as to only one or two of those was the state immunity point germane; the 
result therefore would stand regardless of how the immunity point were decided. The case 
therefore was quite unsuited to New Hampshire's purpose of pursuing the state immunity 
issue, and it cannot be surprising that the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 449 U.S. 806 
(1980). 
113. See, e.g., Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery Revisited-Is the Quondam 
Constitutional Mountain Turning Out to be Only a Judicial Molehill? 52 FORD. L. REv. 329, 
343-46 ( 1983). 
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National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)."114 The 
"limits" thus alluded to are illumined by some of the cases cited in 
the footnote itself. Not all of them, however, are helpful. Lau and 
Fullilove merely indicate that some sort of limitation on Congress's 
power to promote extraneous ends by conditions attached to fed-
eral funding has consistently been presumed; they do not offer en-
lightenment as to what sort of limitation that might be.t 1s Greater 
enlightenment is provided, however, by the passage from the 
Steward Machine opinion cited in the Pennhurst footnote. This 
passage contains Justice Cardozo's observation that the condi-
tional grant program upheld in that case was "not void as involv-
ing the coercion of the States in contravention of the Tenth 
Amendment or of restrictions implicit in our federal form of govern-
ment."116 This passage is highly suggestive, particularly since it is 
coupled in the Pennhurst footnote with a citation to National 
League of Cities. National League of Cities was but an application 
of a restriction "implicit in our federal form of government"-the 
state immunity principle. The reference, both in the cited Steward 
Machine passage and National League of Cities, to "contravention 
of the Tenth Amendment," is unfortunate for reasons that have 
already been explored, but this Pennhurst footnote is clearly a ma-
jority confirmation, albeit in dictum, that the state immunity prin-
ciple is a generic one and applies to requirements imposed upon 
states as conditions of eligibility for federal financial assistance.111 
IV 
Of all the overlapping groups that seek to promote their par-
ticular interests by national legislation today, it is only the states 
114. 451 U.S. I, 17 n.I3 (1981). 
115. The relevant passage in Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 475, merely affirms without specifi-
cation that some limitation exists. The cited passage in Lau makes reference by page 
number to the particular passage in the Steward Machine opinion where Justice Cardozo 
disavowed addressing whether spending conditions could be imposed that were "unrelated 
in subject matter to activities fairly within the scope of national policy and power," argua-
bly constituting intrusions by Congress "upon fields foreign to its function." To take seri-
ously any suggestion that Congress's discretion in setting spending conditions is limited to 
promoting objectives "fairly within the scope of national policy and power" would be to 
revive James Madison's narrow and rightly repudiated view of Congress's power to spend. 
It is hardly credible that the Pennhurst majority intended to suggest such a radical revolu-
tion in doctrine. 
116. 301 U.S. at 585 (emphasis added). 
117. Reference continues to be made, of course, to Oklahoma v. Civil Service 
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). If an identical case were to arise today, however, there 
certainly would be ground to argue that the Hatch Act political activity restrictions condi-
tioning federal highway aid do present a state immunity issue. To raise the issue, of course, 
is no~ ~o decide it: a judgment would have to be made whether the impact of that funding 
condil!On were sufficiently comparable to the enormous impact presented by application of 
the FLSA to state employees that it should be adjudged "undue." 
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as political communities to whom the Constitution extends special 
solicitude. This is not from any desire to protect the prerogatives 
of parochialism, but out of a sober sense that democracy is best 
promoted by enhancing the capacity of citizens to deal with most 
matters that concern them closer to home. The importance of fed-
eralism in promoting citizen self-government-that essential right 
of states as political communities in a republican scheme-is so 
great that it is not to be destroyed by simple majorities in the na-
tional legislative forum. 
It is a great illustration of the inadequacy of a constitutional 
jurisprudence that staggers from case to case without an eye on 
general principles, 11s that most of the judicial and academic com-
mentators on National League of Cities still view it as merely a 
"commerce clause" case-and an anomalous one at that. In real-
ity, it illustrates a sensible, generic, and historically well-founded 
state immunity principle, the essence of which is thoughtful judg-
ment whether the interests of the nation's constituent political 
communities in effective self-government are "unduly" impaired. 
Thus safeguarding the constitutional structure from hasty tamper-
ing by transient majorities targeting immediate aims is one of the 
most important functions that the judiciary can, heretofore has, 
and must continue to perform. 
118. Justice Frankfurter wrote in New York v. United States that "(o)ne of the greatest 
sources of strength of our law is that it adjudicates concrete cases and does not pronounce 
principles in the abstract." 326 U.S. at 575. But even he acknowledged that "there comes a 
time when . . . the process of empiric adjudication calls for a more rational disposition 
than that the immediate case is not different from preceding cases." Id Frankfurter's 
"process of empiric adjudication" has merit, of course; but so does the process of "rational 
disposition," involving the application of "abstract" principles. The Constitution is an inte-
grated intellectual construct; and untoward consequences can result from application of 
one or another of its provisions in isolation without attention to the conceptual structure as 
a whole. Today's decision of what seems an isolated question might tomorrow work mis-
chief as precedent in an unanticipated quarter; distortions can be caused in a far comer of 
the fabric by the pulling of some seemingly unconnected thread. The typical common-law 
type of case by case doctrinal evolution is less appropriate in Constitutional than in other 
realms of law; for here the constant point of reference must be, not merely the precedents, 
but rather the coherent (even though abstract) conceptual construct of the Constitution. 
Only by careful attention to analysis and theory can the practical operating system o~ lib-
erty and republican government effectively be maintained; for the advantage o~ a wntten 
constitution, if properly designed and used, is precisely that it does establish an mtegrated 
and coherent set of abstract concepts, to be modified only through extraordinary delibera-
tion, against which government responses to empiric exigencies can be tested, and by appli-
cation of which the hand of force can be restrained. 
